Add real IMAP4rev1/POP3 implementations, DKIM/DMARC/SPF, SpamAssassin delivery hook
IMAP (RFC 3501): LOGIN through UID, previously all stubs except CAPABILITY/LOGOUT/a partial APPEND. Multi-folder support with per-folder UID/flag indexing (new MailFolder class, backed by .uidvalidity/.uidnext/ .imapindex sidecar files), ENVELOPE support (new MessageHeaders class: header parsing, address-list parsing, IMAP quoting), and shared cursor-based argument parsing (new IMAPArgs class: sequence sets, flag lists, dates, folder-name normalization, and path-traversal protection via isValidFolderName - a bare ".." folder name would otherwise resolve into a sibling user's mailbox directory). POP3 (RFC 1939): USER through QUIT, previously only CAPA. Added UIDL. POP3 handlers use cursor-based parsing throughout rather than indexed access - ZString's copy constructor doesn't copy its `list` field, and POP3's dispatch passes the request by value, so indexed access into a copy was silently reading nothing. SMTP: DMARC evaluation added to the DATA-terminator path (DKIM verification + alignment/policy, Authentication-Results header, conditional rejection matching RFC 7489 6.3's p=reject + sampled pct=). AUTH LOGIN now handles RFC 4954's optional inline initial response (e.g. Python smtplib's "AUTH LOGIN <base64>" in one line) instead of only the exact three-line form. Outbound relay now forces IPv4 (AF_INET) instead of AF_UNSPEC - this server's IPv4 has a correct PTR record and SPF coverage, its IPv6 doesn't, and Gmail was rejecting outbound mail with 550 5.7.25 as a result. Delivery pipeline: local delivery now runs the message through SpamAssassin (new SpamAssassinFilter class, speaking spamd's PROCESS protocol directly over a raw socket - fails open/delivers unscanned if spamd is unreachable) instead of a plain hardlink, since scanning can tag/modify content. BARANTMailConfig: extracted config loading into its own class. compile: (see individual file changes - build script adjustments to match the above). Deliberately excluded from this commit: barantmail.log/ barantmail-service.log (operational logs, not source - barantmail.log in particular was the runaway 55GB/12.9GB file from a busy-loop bug fixed separately in ServerCore) and barantmail.cfg (this server's own live deployment config, matching how APIServer's equivalent config also stays untracked).
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@@ -6,14 +6,33 @@ namespace mail {
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int __SMTP_AUTH::processCommand(coreutils::ZString &request, SMTPSession &session, SMTPServer &server) {
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coreutils::Base64 base64;
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switch(session.authState) {
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case USER_UNKNOWN:
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if(request[1].equals("LOGIN")) {
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session.out << "334 VXNlcm5hbWU6" << CRLF;
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// setTimer(10.0f);
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session.authState = USER_QUERY;
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grabInput(session);
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// SMTPServer's CommandList splits the line only once ("AUTH",
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// depth=1 - see its own constructor), so request[1] here is
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// "LOGIN" alone for the classic multi-step form, but "LOGIN
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// <base64>" as ONE token when a client supplies RFC 4954 4's
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// optional initial-response inline to save a round trip -
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// confirmed live against Python's smtplib, which does exactly
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// that. The old request[1].equals("LOGIN") exact-match rejected
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// every such client with a spurious 504, never reaching the
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// inline response at all.
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if(request[1].ifNextIgnoreCase("LOGIN")) {
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request[1].skipWhitespace();
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if(!request[1].eod()) {
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session.userName = base64.decode(request[1].unparsed());
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session.out << "334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6" << CRLF;
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session.authState = USER_SECRET_QUERY;
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grabInput(session);
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} else {
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session.out << "334 VXNlcm5hbWU6" << CRLF;
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// setTimer(10.0f);
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session.authState = USER_QUERY;
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grabInput(session);
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}
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}
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else {
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session.out << "504 AUTH method not supported." << CRLF;
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@@ -21,7 +40,27 @@ namespace mail {
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return 1;
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case USER_QUERY:
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session.userName = request[0];
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// RFC 4954 4: a bare "*" cancels the exchange rather than being
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// treated as (still-encoded) credential data.
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if (request.equals("*")) {
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session.out << "501 5.7.0 Authentication cancelled" << CRLF;
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session.authState = USER_UNKNOWN;
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clearGrab(session);
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return 1;
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}
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// grabInput() above means this line never goes through
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// CommandList's own .split() (see CommandList::processRequest's
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// grab branch) - request[0] here was actually an out-of-bounds
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// read on an always-empty list, not "the first word". The
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// whole line IS the client's response: a single base64-encoded
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// token with no embedded whitespace, exactly what the unsplit
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// request already holds. It was never decoded either - AUTH
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// LOGIN's wire format sends the username/password base64
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// encoded (that's what the "334 VXNlcm5hbWU6"/"334
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// UGFzc3dvcmQ6" challenges - "Username:"/"Password:" - signal)
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// - comparing the raw, still-encoded text against a plaintext
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// secret file could never match for any real client.
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session.userName = base64.decode(request);
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// setTimer(0.0f);
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session.out << "334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6" << CRLF;
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// setTimer(10.0f);
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@@ -29,9 +68,14 @@ namespace mail {
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return 1;
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case USER_SECRET_QUERY:
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session.password = request[0];
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if (request.equals("*")) {
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session.out << "501 5.7.0 Authentication cancelled" << CRLF;
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session.authState = USER_UNKNOWN;
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clearGrab(session);
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return 1;
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}
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session.password = base64.decode(request);
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// setTimer(0.0f);
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coreutils::Base64 base64;
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if(authLogin(session.userName, session.password, server)) {
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session.out << "235 2.7.0 Authentication successful" << CRLF;
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session.relay = true;
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@@ -39,7 +83,16 @@ namespace mail {
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clearGrab(session);
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}
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else {
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// Reset back to a clean, addressable state - without this,
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// the session stayed grabbed and stuck expecting yet another
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// "password" line forever after one wrong guess, since
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// nothing else ever set authState back to USER_UNKNOWN or
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// released the grab. A client that mistypes a password needs
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// to be able to retry AUTH on the same connection, not
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// reconnect entirely.
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session.out << "530 Login was unsuccessful." << CRLF;
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session.authState = USER_UNKNOWN;
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clearGrab(session);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -47,11 +100,10 @@ namespace mail {
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}
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bool __SMTP_AUTH::authLogin(coreutils::ZString &userName, coreutils::ZString &password, SMTPServer &server) {
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coreutils::MString secretPath;
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secretPath << server.mailFileSystem.getMailBoxPath(userName) << "/.password";
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coreutils::File secret(secretPath);
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secret.read();
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return password == secret.asZString();
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// The actual check now lives in MailFileSystem::checkPassword(),
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// shared with IMAP LOGIN and POP3 USER/PASS - see its own doc
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// comment.
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return server.mailFileSystem.checkPassword(userName, password);
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}
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}
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