Files
BARANTMail/DMARCChecker.h
Brad Arant cd5e0a9905 Add real IMAP4rev1/POP3 implementations, DKIM/DMARC/SPF, SpamAssassin delivery hook
IMAP (RFC 3501): LOGIN through UID, previously all stubs except
CAPABILITY/LOGOUT/a partial APPEND. Multi-folder support with per-folder
UID/flag indexing (new MailFolder class, backed by .uidvalidity/.uidnext/
.imapindex sidecar files), ENVELOPE support (new MessageHeaders class:
header parsing, address-list parsing, IMAP quoting), and shared
cursor-based argument parsing (new IMAPArgs class: sequence sets, flag
lists, dates, folder-name normalization, and path-traversal protection
via isValidFolderName - a bare ".." folder name would otherwise resolve
into a sibling user's mailbox directory).

POP3 (RFC 1939): USER through QUIT, previously only CAPA. Added UIDL.
POP3 handlers use cursor-based parsing throughout rather than indexed
access - ZString's copy constructor doesn't copy its `list` field, and
POP3's dispatch passes the request by value, so indexed access into a
copy was silently reading nothing.

SMTP: DMARC evaluation added to the DATA-terminator path (DKIM
verification + alignment/policy, Authentication-Results header,
conditional rejection matching RFC 7489 6.3's p=reject + sampled pct=).
AUTH LOGIN now handles RFC 4954's optional inline initial response
(e.g. Python smtplib's "AUTH LOGIN <base64>" in one line) instead of
only the exact three-line form. Outbound relay now forces IPv4
(AF_INET) instead of AF_UNSPEC - this server's IPv4 has a correct PTR
record and SPF coverage, its IPv6 doesn't, and Gmail was rejecting
outbound mail with 550 5.7.25 as a result.

Delivery pipeline: local delivery now runs the message through
SpamAssassin (new SpamAssassinFilter class, speaking spamd's PROCESS
protocol directly over a raw socket - fails open/delivers unscanned if
spamd is unreachable) instead of a plain hardlink, since scanning can
tag/modify content.

BARANTMailConfig: extracted config loading into its own class.

compile: (see individual file changes - build script adjustments to
match the above).

Deliberately excluded from this commit: barantmail.log/
barantmail-service.log (operational logs, not source - barantmail.log
in particular was the runaway 55GB/12.9GB file from a busy-loop bug
fixed separately in ServerCore) and barantmail.cfg (this server's own
live deployment config, matching how APIServer's equivalent
config also stays untracked).
2026-09-03 05:24:22 +00:00

94 lines
4.0 KiB
C++

#ifndef __DMARCChecker_h__
#define __DMARCChecker_h__
#include "DKIMVerifier.h"
#include "SPFChecker.h"
#include <string>
#include <vector>
namespace mail {
///
/// DMARCChecker implements RFC 7489: a message is DMARC-authenticated
/// if EITHER SPF or DKIM passed AND is "aligned" with the RFC 5322
/// From: header's domain (the identity a human actually sees) - SPF
/// alone checks the envelope sender, DKIM alone checks whatever
/// domain signed it, and neither by itself stops a message whose
/// From: header claims a domain that had nothing to do with either
/// check. Requires both SPFChecker's result and DKIMVerifier's
/// results as input, since DMARC is defined entirely in terms of
/// those two other mechanisms' outcomes plus the alignment check.
///
/// Not implemented: the RFC 7489 Public Suffix List-based
/// organizational-domain derivation for relaxed alignment - the
/// PSL is a several-thousand-entry external data file this codebase
/// has no copy of and no fetch mechanism for. Approximated instead
/// by comparing the last two dot-separated labels (e.g. treating
/// "mail.example.com" and "example.com" as aligned via
/// "example.com"), which is correct for ordinary domains but wrong
/// for registrations directly under a multi-label public suffix
/// (e.g. "example.co.uk" and "other.co.uk" would incorrectly be
/// treated as aligned via "co.uk"). Exact (strict) alignment,
/// requested via adkim=s/aspf=s, is unaffected by this and is exact
/// either way.
///
class DMARCChecker {
public:
enum class Result { Pass, Fail, None };
struct Policy {
bool found = false;
std::string policy = "none"; // p=
std::string subdomainPolicy; // sp= (defaults to policy if absent)
bool strictDKIM = false; // adkim=s (default r, relaxed)
bool strictSPF = false; // aspf=s (default r, relaxed)
int percent = 100; // pct=
};
///
/// fromDomain: the RFC 5322 From: header's domain (what a human
/// reading the message actually sees as the sender).
/// spfDomain/spfResult: the identity SPF was actually evaluated
/// against (RFC 7208 2.4 - the MAIL FROM domain, or HELO's for a
/// null reverse-path) and its result.
/// dkimResults: every DKIM-Signature DKIMVerifier found on this
/// message, verified or not.
/// appliedPolicy is filled in with the policy that was actually
/// looked up (found==false if none was published at all - the
/// domain isn't participating in DMARC, so this always resolves
/// to Result::None regardless of alignment).
///
static Result evaluate(const std::string &fromDomain, const std::string &spfDomain, SPFChecker::Result spfResult,
const std::vector<DKIMVerifier::SignatureResult> &dkimResults, Policy &appliedPolicy);
static std::string resultName(Result result);
///
/// A DMARC-aware Authentication-Results header (RFC 8601) -
/// summarizes spf=/dkim=/dmarc= together, the modern convention
/// downstream filtering actually looks for (Received-SPF alone,
/// which __SMTP_MAIL.cpp already adds, predates DMARC and doesn't
/// record dkim/dmarc results at all).
///
static std::string authenticationResultsHeader(SPFChecker::Result spfResult, const std::string &spfDomain,
const std::vector<DKIMVerifier::SignatureResult> &dkimResults,
Result dmarcResult, const std::string &fromDomain,
const std::string &receivingHost);
private:
static bool lookupPolicy(const std::string &domain, Policy &policyOut);
static std::string organizationalDomain(const std::string &domain);
static bool aligned(const std::string &identityDomain, const std::string &fromDomain, bool strict);
};
}
#endif