Security:
- SMTP smuggling (CVE-2023-51764 family): only <CRLF>.<CRLF> ends DATA
(strict CRLF framing); bare CR/LF in the text is stored as CR LF.
Before, '<LF>.<LF>' and four other variants ended the message and the
rest ran as fresh commands - a second, forged message was delivered.
- STARTTLS on port 25 (RFC 3207), using the configured tls cert; AUTH
is only offered/accepted once encrypted (538 5.7.11 otherwise).
- The 250 reply no longer discloses the queue file's full path.
- Queue file names %-encode the addresses ('/' or '|' in an address
broke the name or pointed it into another directory).
Conformance (RFC 5321, 1870, 2034, 2920, 3207, 3463, 3848, 4616, 4954,
6152):
- 500 for unknown/empty/over-long commands (no reply at all before -
clients hung); 501 for missing/invalid arguments (bare MAIL/RCPT/HELO
were out-of-bounds reads).
- HELO/EHLO required before MAIL; nested MAIL refused; EHLO/HELO/RSET/
end-of-DATA reset the transaction.
- MAIL: SIZE= (552 when over the limit), BODY=7BIT|8BITMIME, AUTH=;
555 for anything else; case-insensitive keywords; address syntax
checked.
- RCPT: postmaster (bare and any case) accepted; case-insensitive
domain and local-part; 550 5.1.1 unknown user vs 550 5.7.1 relay
denied; aliases accepted (they were rejected at RCPT before); 1000
recipient cap (452 4.5.3).
- ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES advertised and used on every reply.
- AUTH PLAIN added alongside LOGIN; strict base64; 535 5.7.8 on
failure; 503 before EHLO, during a transaction, or when already
authenticated (the last one sent no reply before).
- Received: per RFC 5321 4.4 with client IP, protocol per RFC 3848
(ESMTP/ESMTPS/ESMTPSA) and queue id; Return-Path: added at local
delivery.
tests/smtp_conformance.py: 112 checks. origin/master passes 37 of the
72 it can reach before the server stops answering; this passes 112/112.
tests/imap_pop3_regression.py: IMAPS/POP3S unaffected (3/3).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0121tAhQVe4qbCwYgVjKQS4B
102 lines
3.6 KiB
C++
102 lines
3.6 KiB
C++
#ifndef __SMTPSession_h__
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# define __SMTPSession_h__
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# include "TCPSession.h"
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# include "TCPServer.h"
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# include "MString.h"
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# include "SPFChecker.h"
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# define CRLF "\r\n"
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namespace mail {
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enum State {CONNECT, READY, READYX, MAIL, RCPT, DATA, SENT};
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// PLAIN_QUERY: AUTH PLAIN sent with no initial response, waiting for
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// the client's single base64 response (RFC 4616, RFC 4954 4).
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enum AuthState {USER_UNKNOWN, USER_QUERY, USER_SECRET_QUERY, USER_KNOWN, PLAIN_QUERY};
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enum Mode {WAIT_FOR_DATA, RECEIVE_DATA};
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class SMTPSession : public core::TCPSession {
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public:
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SMTPSession(core::EPoll &ePoll, core::TCPServer &server);
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void onConnected() override;
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///
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/// Longest command line accepted. RFC 5321 4.5.3.1.4 sets 512 as the
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/// minimum a server must handle; RFC 4954 4 raises it to 12288 for
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/// AUTH with an initial response, so that is the cap used for all
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/// commands. Message text lines are bounded separately (see the
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/// constructor's maxLineLength).
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///
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static const size_t maxCommandLine = 12288;
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///
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/// Abort any mail transaction: what RSET, EHLO, HELO and the end of
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/// DATA all do (RFC 5321 4.1.1.5, 4.1.4). Keeps the greeting and any
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/// authentication.
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///
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void resetTransaction();
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///
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/// Forget everything learned from the client - what STARTTLS
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/// requires once the handshake starts (RFC 3207 4.2): greeting,
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/// authentication and any transaction.
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///
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void resetAll();
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bool greeted = false; // HELO or EHLO accepted (RFC 5321 4.1.4)
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bool esmtp = false; // ... and it was EHLO, so extensions apply
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bool dataLineTooLong = false;
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std::string queueId; // id of the message being received, also used in Received:
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coreutils::MString clientDomainName;
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coreutils::MString userName;
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coreutils::MString password;
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coreutils::MString mailData;
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State state = CONNECT;
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AuthState authState = USER_UNKNOWN;
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Mode mode = WAIT_FOR_DATA;
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// Defaults to false: relaying to a non-local recipient is only
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// permitted after a real, successful AUTH (see __SMTP_AUTH.cpp,
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// which sets this true on success) - defaulting to true made every
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// brand-new, unauthenticated connection an open relay for anyone
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// (__SMTP_RCPT.cpp checks exactly this flag before accepting a
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// recipient whose mailbox does not exist locally).
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bool relay = false;
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coreutils::MString from;
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std::vector<coreutils::MString> recipientList;
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// Computed once at MAIL FROM time (see __SMTP_MAIL.cpp) and
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// reused at DATA time (__SMTP_DATA.cpp), rather than re-running
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// the SPF DNS lookups a second time for the same transaction. The
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// header is ready to prepend to the message as-is; domain/result
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// are also kept separately since DMARC's own alignment check
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// (also run at DATA time) needs the raw identity/result, not the
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// pre-formatted header text.
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std::string spfHeader;
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std::string spfDomain;
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SPFChecker::Result spfResult = SPFChecker::Result::None;
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protected:
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///
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/// Commands are dispatched through the server's CommandList as
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/// before; this adds the replies RFC 5321 4.2.4 requires that the
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/// generic TCPSession path never sent - 500 for an unrecognized or
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/// empty command line, and 500 for an over-long one. A client that
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/// got no reply at all simply hung.
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///
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void protocol(coreutils::ZString &data) override;
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void onLineTooLong() override;
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};
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}
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#endif
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